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ABSTRACT
This paper studies a new active eavesdropping technique via
the so-called spoofing relay attack, which could be launched
by the eavesdropper to significantly enhance the information
leakage rate from the source over conventional passive eaves-
dropping. With this attack, the eavesdropper acts as a relay
to spoof the source to vary transmission rate in favor of its
eavesdropping performance by either enhancing or degrad-
ing the effective channel of the legitimate link. The maxi-
mum information leakage rate achievable by the eavesdropper
and the corresponding optimal operation at the spoofing relay
are obtained. It is shown that such a spoofing relay attack
could impose new challenges from a physical-layer security
perspective since it leads to significantly higher information
leakage rate than conventional passive eavesdropping.
Index Terms— Physical-layer security, active eavesdrop-
ping, spoofing relay attack.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are vulnerable to eavesdropping by
unintended recipients due to the broadcast nature of wireless
channels. The conventional cryptographic mechanism [1],
though provides an effective approach for secure communi-
cations, is facing with unprecedented challenges due to the
fast growing computation power of the eavesdroppers, the
increased complexity in key generation and management,
etc. Recently, there has been a significant research interest in
achieving secure wireless communications by exploiting the
inherent wireless channel characteristics of the legitimate
and adversary users, which is known as physical-layer
security [2]. Under the classic wiretap channel framework [3],
numerous efforts have been devoted to characterizing the
secrecy capacity [4–6], or the maximum transmission rate
at which the message can be reliably decoded at the legiti-
mate receiver without leaking any useful information to the
eavesdropper.
Most of the existing works on physical-layer security have
assumed the theoretical setup with passive eavesdroppers
only. In practice, the eavesdropper could launch proactive
attacks to enhance their eavesdropping performance, a tech-
nique known as active eavesdropping [7]. For instance, in
multi-antenna time-division duplexing (TDD) systems with
reverse-link channel training, the eavesdropper may attack
the channel training phase by sending identical pilots as the
legitimate receiver, so that the estimated channel at the source
transmitter, based on which precoding is designed for the
data transmission phase, is a linear combination of those
of the legitimate and eavesdropping links. Such an active
attack is known as pilot contamination attack [8], by which
the eavesdropper can enhance its effective channel from
the source transmitter, and hence boost its eavesdropping
capacity, while simultaneously degrading the channel of the
legitimate link. Various schemes have been proposed to detect
such a pilot contamination attack [9–13].
In this paper, we study a new active attack termed spoofing
relay attack, which could be launched by the eavesdropper to
significantly enhance the effective information leakage rate
eavesdropped from the source over the conventional passive
eavesdropping. With this attack, the eavesdropper acts as a
relay to spoof the source to vary transmission rate in favor of
its eavesdropping performance, assuming that adaptive rate
transmission is adopted at the source based on the effective
channel to the legitimate receiver. Specifically, if the eaves-
dropper has a better channel than that of the legitimate re-
ceiver, it will enhance the effective channel of the legitimate
link by forwarding a constructive signal to the receiver, which
leads to higher transmission rate by the source, and hence
higher information leakage rate; otherwise, it will degrade
the effective channel of the legitimate link via forwarding a
destructive signal to the receiver, so as to spoof the source to
reduce transmission rate to make it decodable by the eaves-
dropper. The maximum information leakage rate achievable
by such a spoofing relay attack is derived, which is shown
to be significantly higher than that attainable by conventional
passive eavesdropping.
Compared to other active eavesdropping techniques such
as the pilot contamination attack, the spoofing relay attack
could lead to more severe security risks, since it has a broader
applicability, regardless of single- or multi-antenna, TDD or
frequency-division duplexing (FDD) systems. Furthermore,
it is also more difficult to be detected, since the legitimate
user may attribute the change in its effective channel to the
environmental variations, e.g., the presence of a new signal
path. Devising effective detection schemes and countermea-
sures against the new spoofing relay attack is an interesting
problem, which is left for our future work.
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Fig. 1: A point-to-point link with an active eavesdropper.
2. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a point-to-point wireless
communication system where the source S sends information
to the destinationD in the presence of an eavesdropperE. We
assume that adaptive rate transmission is adopted at S based
on the channel condition perceived at D. However, both S
andD are unaware of the presence of E, so that no dedicated
coding as in conventional physical-layer security (see e.g. [2]-
[6]) is applied to prevent the eavesdropping by E. On the
other hand, the eavesdropper E can conduct either passive or
active eavesdropping, as discussed below.
2.1. Passive Eavesdropping
With passive eavesdropping, E remains silence throughout
the communication between S and D, but tries to decode the
information from S. In this case, the channel capacity of the
legitimate link from S to D, which is also assumed to be the
transmission rate by S, is RD = log2
(
1 + PS |hSD|2/σ2
)
in
bits/second/Hz (bps/Hz), where hSD is the complex-valued
channel gain from S to D, PS is the transmission power at
S, and σ2 is the power of the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at D. Similarly, the channel capacity between S
and E is RE = log2
(
1 + PS |hSE |2/σ2
)
in bps/Hz, with
hSE denoting the channel from S to E. If RE ≥ RD or
equivalently |hSE |2 ≥ |hSD|2, i.e., the eavesdropper has a
better channel than the legitimate receiver, E can reliably de-
code the information sent by S with arbitrarily small error.
As a result, the effective information leakage rate is given
by Rleak = RD. On the other hand, if RE < RD, or the
eavesdropper has a weaker channel than the legitimate re-
ceiver, then it is impossible for E to decode the information
from S with arbitrarily small error. In this case, we define the
effective information leakage rate as Rleak = 0.1 Therefore,
the information leakage rate can be expressed as
Rleak =
{
RD, if RE ≥ RD
0, otherwise.
(1)
2.2. Active Eavesdropping via Spoofing Relay Attack
In this subsection, we consider an active eavesdropper that
launches the spoofing relay attack to enhance the information
leakage rate. With such an attack, the eavesdropper E
1Note that in this case E may still extract useful information from its
received signal; while in this paper we consider a more stringent setup where
the message from S needs to be decoded at E with arbitrarily small error.
operates in a full-duplex mode with simultaneous informa-
tion reception and relaying [14]. We assume the simple
amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying by E since it incurs the
minimal processing delay. By assuming an ideal full-duplex
operation with perfect self-interference cancellation [14],
the signal received by E prior to processing noise addition
is yE = hSE
√
PSdS , where dS ∼ CN (0, 1) denotes the
circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) distributed
information-bearing symbol sent by S. As shown in Fig. 2,
the received signal yE is split into two parts at E, one for
information relaying aiming to alter the effective channel of
the legitimate link from S toD, and the other for information
decoding so as to eavesdrop the message sent by S. Denote
by 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 the power splitting ratio for the signal part split
for information relaying. The transmitted signal xE by E can
then be expressed as
xE = v
(√
ρhSE
√
PSdS + n
(R)
E
)
, (2)
where v is the complex-valued amplification coefficient at E,
and n(R)E ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the AWGN introduced during
the relaying operation at E. By assuming that the processing
delay due to the AF relaying at E is negligible, the signal
received atD can be expressed as
yD = hSD
√
PSdS + hEDxE + nD, (3)
= (hSD + v
√
ρhSEhED)
√
PSdS + vhEDn
(R)
E + nD, (4)
where hED denotes the channel from E to D, and nD ∼
CN (0, σ2) is the AWGN at D. It is observed from (4) that
by adjusting the power splitting ratio ρ and the amplification
coefficient v, the eavesdropper E is able to alter the effective
channel from S toD. The effective capacity of the legitimate
link can then be expressed as R˜D = log2(1 + γ˜D), where γ˜D
is the effective signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at D, which can
be obtained from (4) as a function of ρ and v, given by
γ˜D(ρ, v) =
∣∣hSD + v√ρhSEhED∣∣2 PS
(1 + |v|2|hED|2)σ2 . (5)
On the other hand, at the information decoder of E, the
signal based on which the message from S is decoded can be
expressed as
y˜E =
√
1− ρhSE
√
PSdS + n
(D)
E , (6)
where n(D)E ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the AWGN at the informa-
tion decoder of E. Thus, the information rate achievable by
E is R˜E = log2(1 + γ˜E), where γ˜E is the SNR as a function
of ρ given by
γ˜E(ρ) =
(1− ρ)|hSE |2PS
σ2
. (7)
To study the worst-case scenario under the spoofing relay
attack, we assume that perfect channel state information (CSI)
yE
AF Relaying
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Fig. 2: The architecture of a spoofing relay.
of all links is available atE. The investigation on the spoofing
relay attack with imperfect or limited CSI at E is left for our
future work. The objective of E is to optimize the power
splitting ratio ρ and the amplification coefficient v so that
the information leakage rate is maximized. Based on the
definition in (1), the problem can be formulated as
(P1) :

max
v,ρ
R˜D
s.t. R˜E ≥ R˜D
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
|v|2 (ρ|hSE |2PS + σ2) ≤ PE ,
(8)
where PE denotes the maximum transmission power at E.
3. OPTIMAL SOLUTION
To find the optimal solution to (P1), notice that R˜D and R˜E
in (P1) can be respectively replaced by γ˜D(v, ρ) and γ˜E(ρ)
due to their monotonic relations. Furthermore, for any fixed
power splitting ratio 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, we first obtain the maximum
achievable SNR atD, denoted as γ˜maxD (ρ), by optimizing the
amplification coefficient v as
γ˜maxD (ρ) ,
{
max
v
γ˜D(ρ, v)
s.t. |v|2 ≤ PEρ|hSE |2PS+σ2 .
(9)
It follows from (5) that at the optimal solution to (9), the
phase of v should be chosen such that the two signal paths
from S toD add constructively, i.e., ∠v = ∠hSD −∠hSE −
∠hED, where ∠z denotes the phase of a complex number z.
We term such a strategy of the spoofing relay as constructive
information forwarding, since it helps enhance the effective
channel of the legitimate link from S to D. In addition, the
magnitude of the optimal v to (9) can be obtained by examin-
ing its first-order derivative, and the resulted maximum SNR
can be expressed as
γ˜maxD (ρ) =

(
1 + ρ|hSE |
2
|hSD|2
)
P˜S |hSD|2, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1(√
1+ρ|hSE |2P˜S+ |hSE ||hED||hSD|
√
ρP˜E
)2
P˜S |hSD|2
1+ρ|hSE |2P˜S+|hED|2P˜E ,
ρ1 < ρ ≤ 1,
where ρ1 , min
{
1,
−1+
√
1+4P˜SP˜E |hSD|2|hED|2
2|hSE |2P˜S
}
, with
P˜S , PS/σ2 and P˜E , PE/σ2. It can be verified that
γ˜maxD (ρ) is a monotonically increasing function of 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
In particular, if ρ = 0, i.e., no information forwarding is
applied at E, we have v = 0 and γ˜maxD (0) = P˜S |hSD|2.
This corresponds to the special case of passive eavesdropping
previously discussed in Section 2.1.
On the other hand, for fixed 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, the minimum
achievable SNR at D, denoted as γ˜minD (ρ), can be obtained
by solving
γ˜minD (ρ) ,
{
min
v
γ˜D(ρ, v)
s.t. |v|2 ≤ PEρ|hSE |2PS+σ2 .
(10)
It follows from (5) that at the optimal solution to (10), the
two signal paths from S to D should add destructively, i.e.,
∠v = pi + ∠hSD − ∠hSE − ∠hED. Such a strategy at E
is termed as destructive information forwarding, which es-
sentially degrades the effective channel of the legitimate link
from S toD. Furthermore, by taking the first order derivative
with respect to the magnitude of v, the corresponding optimal
value of (10) can be expressed as
γ˜minD (ρ) =

(√
1+ρ|hSE |2P˜S− |hSE ||hED||hSD|
√
ρP˜E
)2
P˜S |hSD|2
1+ρ|hSE |2P˜S+|hED|2P˜E ,
0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ2
0, ρ2 < ρ ≤ 1,
where ρ2 = C if 0 ≤ C ≤ 1, and ρ2 = 1 otherwise, withC ,
|hSD|2
|hSE |2(|hED|2P˜E−|hSD|2P˜S) . In particular, if ρ = 0, i.e., no in-
formation forwarding by E, we have γ˜minD (0) =
P˜S |hSD|2
1+|hED|2P˜E .
This corresponds to degrading the SNR at D via jamming,
i.e., by amplifying the noise with full power at E. For ρ > 0,
both destructive information forwarding and jamming (i.e.,
noise amplification) contribute to the SNR degradation at D,
as can be seen from the expression of γ˜minD (ρ).
Since γ˜D(ρ, v) is a continuous function of v, for any fixed
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, the set of achievable SNRs at D is given by the
interval
[
γ˜minD (ρ), γ˜
max
D (ρ)
]
. Consequently, (P1) reduces to
finding the optimal power splitting ratio ρ via solving
(P2) :

max
0≤ρ≤1
γ˜D(ρ)
s.t. γ˜minD (ρ) ≤ γ˜D(ρ) ≤ γ˜maxD (ρ)
γ˜D(ρ) ≤ γ˜E(ρ),
(11)
which can be solved by considering the following three cases.
Case 1: γ˜maxD (0) < γ˜E(0), or |hSD|2 < |hSE |2, as
illustrated in Fig. 3(a). In this case, E has a better channel
than the legitimate receiver D. Intuitively, E should perform
constructive information forwarding to enhance the effective
channel of D so as to increase the information leakage rate.
It follows from Fig. 3(a) that the optimal solution to (P2) is
given by the intersection point of the two curves γ˜maxD (ρ) and
γ˜E(ρ). As γ˜maxD (ρ) and γ˜E(ρ) are monotonically increasing
and decreasing functions over 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, respectively, and
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Fig. 3: Three cases for the optimal power splitting solution.
γ˜maxD (1) > γ˜E(1) = 0, the equation γ˜
max
D (ρ) = γ˜E(ρ) has
one unique solution ρ?, which can be obtained numerically.
Case 2: γ˜minD (0) ≤ γ˜E(0) ≤ γ˜maxD (0), or |hSD|
2
1+|hED|2P˜E ≤
|hSE |2 ≤ |hSD|2, as illustrated in Fig. 3(b). In this case,
the eavesdropping link is worse than the legitimate link, but
it becomes better if jamming with full power is applied at E
to degrade the legitimate link. It follows from Fig. 3(b) that
the optimal solution to (P2) is ρ? = 0, i.e., no information
forwarding and only jamming is applied by E with normal-
ized jamming power P˜ ?E =
1
|hED|2
(
|hSD|2
|hSE |2 − 1
)
to degrade
the legitimate link SNR to the same level as that at E.
Case 3: γ˜E(0) < γ˜minD (0), or |hSE |2 < |hSD|
2
1+|hED|2P˜E , as
illustrated in Fig. 3(c). In this case, the eavesdropping link
is worse than the legitimate link even after jamming with full
power by E. Therefore, destructive information forwarding
and jamming should be both applied at E to further degrade
the legitimate link. It follows from Fig. 3(c) that the optimal
solution ρ? to (P2) is obtained by solving γ˜minD (ρ) = γ˜E(ρ)
in the interval 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, which can be reduced to a quartic
equation and hence solved efficiently. Note that if more than
one solutions exist, the one with the smallest magnitude is
the optimal solution. On the other hand, if no such a solu-
tion exists, it implies that problem (P2), and hence (P1), is
infeasible, i.e., the spoofing relay attack is not sufficient to
degrade the source transmission rate to a level achievable by
the eavesdropper with its given power constraint.
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assume that the source S and the legitimate receiver D
are separated by a fixed distance dSD = 1000 meters, and
the eavesdropper E moves along the line from S to D with
the distance dSE varying from 50 to 3000 meters. We as-
sume line-of-sight (LoS) channels with free-space path loss
model, and the operating frequency is assumed to be 1.8 GHz.
The source transmission power PS is set to a value such that
the received SNR at D (without eavesdropper’s attack) is 10
dB. By assuming PE = PS , Fig. 4 plots the information
leakage rate Rleak versus dSE by passive eavesdropping ver-
Constructive information 
forwarding
Jamming only
Destructive information 
forwarding & jamming
Fig. 4: The information leakage rate with passive versus active
eavesdropping.
sus the studied active eavesdropping, with Rleak given by
(1). It is observed that with passive eavesdropping, a constant
Rleak, whose value is determined by the legitimate link, is
achieved when E has a better channel than D, i.e., dSE ≤
dSD; whereas if dSE > dSD, Rleak drops to zero since E
cannot reliably decode the information from S. In contrast,
with the active spoofing relay attack, E is able to achieve
much higher information leakage rate. Fig. 4 also shows the
three different strategies of the spoofing relay attack by the
eavesdropper, namely constructive information forwarding,
jamming, and both destructive information forwarding and
jamming, which correspond to the three cases for determining
the optimal power splitting ratio studied in Section 3.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper studies a new active eavesdropping technique via
the spoofing relay attack. Depending on the channel con-
ditions, the eavesdropper constructively or destructively for-
wards the information signal to the destination, so as to spoof
the source to increase or decrease the transmission rate to
maximize the information leakage rate. It is shown that with
this new attack, the eavesdropper can significantly enhance
the information leakage rate over the conventional passive
eavesdropping. This paper opens a new avenue for investi-
gating the physical-layer security with more intelligent eaves-
droppers than conventional passive listeners.
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